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The use of narrative in law raises a number of
philosophical/jurisprudentia issues. Narrative has been used primarily by
critical theorists, including critical race theorists,1 Latino legal theorists, 2
Asian-American legal theorists,3 feminist theorists, 4 and gay/lesbian legal
theorists. 5 They offer narrative as a way to introduce a perspective that is
not represented in mainstream legal discourse.
Drawing on philosophy, I explain the importance of narrative for
outsiders and offer responses to some important philosophical or
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1. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); see also, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE
BOTTOM OF THE WELL (1992); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS
(1991).
2. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, "Melting Pot" or "Ring of Fire"?: Assimilation and
the Mexican-American Experience, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1259 (1997); Gerald P. L6pez, Lay
Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1984); Yxta Maya Murray, Merit-Teaching, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1073 (1996); Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather's Stories, and
Immigration Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425
(1990).
3. See, e.g., Margaret H.R. Chon, On the Need for Asian-American Narratives in Law:
Ethnic Specimens, Native Informants, Storytelling and Silences, 3 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 4
(1995).
4. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986).
5. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1994).
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jurisprudential objections to the use of narrative in law. In particular, I
respond to the following claims: (1) the use of narrative is an illegitimate
externalist approach to law; (2) the use of narrative is misguided because it
does not seek to ascertain truth, but instead seeks to change the law; and (3)
the use of narrative is hostile to "reason." This philosophical discussion is
especially timely and important because although some of the leading critics
of narrative have recognized the relevance of philosophy to the debate over
the use of narrative in law,6 they have refused to squarely confront the
philosophical issues implicated in the debate.
7
II. THE PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF NARRATIVE FOR OUTSIDERS
The philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard's notion of the "differend" helps
show the importance of narrative for outsiders. Without narrative, minorities
experience the differend. Lyotard says that the dominant idea of justice can
silence subordinate persons.8 The differend arises when there is a conflict
between two conceptions of justice and there is an effort to judge an
individual who does not hold the foundational views of the regime that
stands in judgment of the individual.9 In such a situation, the subordinate
person lacks "a forum and a language" which would allow them to express
how they have been injured.10 African-Americans have experienced this
difficulty. For hundreds of years, blacks had no standing to sue for the
injuries they sustained at the hands of the white majority.11 They sustained
more than legal injuries. 12 They were harmed because they had "no forum in
which they could speak." 13 In such circumstances, the prevailing conception
6. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 9, 96-99 (1997).
7. See Francis J. Mootz, III, Between Truth and Provocation: Reclaiming Reason in
American Legal Scholarship, 10 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 605, 614-15 (1998) (lamenting the
lack of philosophical analysis in the controversy over the use of narrative in legal
scholarship).
8. See DOUGLAS E. LITOwITz, POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHY & LAW 119 (1997).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 119-20.
11. Id. at 120.
12. Id.
13. Id. Lyotard explains:
In the differend, something "asks" to be put into phrases, and suffers from the wrong
of not being able to be put into phrases right away . . .this state includes silence,
which is a negative phrase, but it also calls upon phrases which are in principle
possible. This state is signalled by what one ordinarily calls a feeling: "One cannot
find the words, etc."
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of justice deprives the person of a "voice that can be heard on terms which
the system will understand." 14 Lyotard says:
I would like to call a differend the case where the plaintiff is divested of the
means to argue and becomes for that reason a victim. 15
When one experiences an injury that cannot be established in a given system
of justice, one is victimized and one's claim "constitutes a differend lying
outside the system of justice."16 The differend cannot be acknowledged or
comprehended by those who brought it into existence. 17 In general, it seems
minorities experience the differend: their harms sometimes cannot be
recognized by the justice system-i.e., the traditional forms of legal
argument.
Consider some examples. Mexican-Americans have faced the differend.
They have sometimes found that our legal system has not recognized their
harms. In Hernandez v. State,18 a Mexican-American man had been
convicted of murder. He sought to reverse his conviction on the ground that
Mexican-Americans had been illegally excluded from serving on the jury.
He relied on case law holding that it was a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to exclude blacks from serving on
juries. The court, however, found that the Fourteenth Amendment protected
only two races: blacks and whites. 19 In this regard, the court held that
Mexican-Americans are "white."20 Since the juries that indicted and
convicted the defendant were composed of white persons-i.e., members of
JEAN FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE DIFFEREND: PHRASES IN DISPUTE 13 (Georges Van Den
Abbeele trans., 1988).
14. See LITOWITZ, supra note 8, at 120.
15. See LYOTARD, supra note 13, at 9, xi. "[A] differend would be a case of conflict,
between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgment
applicable to both arguments." Id.
16. See LITOWITZ, supra note 8, at 120.
17. Id.
18. 251 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. 1952). For more on the Hernandez case, see Ian F. Haney
Lopez, Race Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV.
1143 (1997).
19. See Hernandez, 251 S.W.2d at 535.
20. Id. For more on the legal construction of Mexican-Americans as white, see George
A. Martinez, The Legal Construction of Race: Mexican-Americans and Whiteness, 2 HARV.
LATINO L. REv. 321 (1997). For additional scholarship on the analysis of "whiteness," see




his own race-there was no equal protection violation.2 1 In Hernandez,
Mexican-Americans were confronted with the differend. The system did not
recognize the harm they suffered from having no Mexican-Americans on
juries.
Consider another example. In Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee,22 a
Native American community sought to reclaim certain tribal lands. The
Mashpee alleged that the lands had been acquired from them in
contravention of the Indian Non-Intercourse Act of 1970.23 That Act bars
the sale of Indian land unless the federal government has approved the
sale.24 The Mashpee argued that its land had been sold without the approval
of the United States. In response, the defendant Town of Mashpee contended
that the Mashpee were not covered by the Act because they were not a tribe.
In order to prevail, the Mashpee had to establish that they were a "tribe"
at the time the land was transferred. Relying on earlier case law, the court
defined "tribe" as a "body of Indians of the same or similar race, united in a
community under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular
though sometimes ill-defined territory." 25 Applying this definition, the court
held that the Mashpee were not a tribe.26
The Mashpee disagreed with the court's definition of a "tribe." They
argued that their tribal identity could be established through an alternative
conception of a tribe-i.e., one based on their long-term relationship with
the land and their maintenance of unique cultural practices. 27 That notion of
a "tribe," however, could not be recognized by the legal system. Thus, the
system could not recognize their claim. The Mashpee experienced the
differend.
Narrative provides a language for minorities to communicate harms.
Without narrative, minorities have no voice to explain how they have been
harmed. Their claims cannot, at times, be vindicated within the present
system. Thus, minorities face the differend, deprived of a language to
express claims that are located somewhere outside of the system.
Consider how narrative might have been useful in the Hernandez case.
If the Mexican-American defendant had been able to use narrative, 28 he
21. See Hernandez, 251 S.W.2d at 536.
22. 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978).
23. Id. at 947; see 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994).
24. 25 U.S.C. § 177.
25. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).
26. Mashpee Tribe, 447 F. Supp. at 950.
27. See Cheryl 1. Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1709, 1765 (1993).
28. In this case, such a narrative would be what has been termed a journalistic
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could have shown that he was harmed by the absence of Mexican-
Americans on the jury. Narrative would have shown that he was not
protected by having whites on the jury because white Anglos constructed
Mexican-Americans as non-white. Two examples of the descriptions that
Anglos produced regarding Mexican-Americans will suffice. The historian
David Weber writes:
Anglo Americans found an additional element to despise in Mexicans: racial
mixture. American visitors to the Mexican frontier were nearly unanimous in
commenting on the dark skin of Mexican mestizos who, it was generally
agreed, had inherited the worst qualities of Spaniards and Indians to produce
a "race" still more despicable than that of either parent.
29
Similarly, another commentator described how Anglo Americans drew a
clear racial distinction between themselves and Mexican-Americans:
Racial myths about Mexicans appeared as soon as Mexicans began to meet
Anglo American settlers in the early nineteenth century. The differences in
attitudes, temperament, and behavior were supposed to be genetic. It is hard
now to imagine the normal Mexican mixture of Spanish and Indian's as
constituting a distinct "race", but the Anglo Americans of the Southwest
defined it as such.
30
Through narrative, the defendant in Hernandez could have explained
how he was injured by not having Mexican-Americans on the jury. Since the
narrative would have established him as non-white, he could have shown
that he was not protected by having whites instead of Mexican-Americans
on the jury.
Thus, narrative can and has been used by outsiders to point out various
injuries that they have sustained. For instance, in an effort to rebut those
who argue that we should limit the number of Latinos that are allowed to
immigrate into the United States on the ground that they refuse to assimilate
into the American mainstream, Kevin Johnson has employed narrative to
eloquently describe the psychological damage that is suffered by Latinos
account-a legal narrative that "purports to describe things as they actually happened." Yxta
Maya Murray, Legal Fictions 14 (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
29. FOREIGNERS IN THEIR NATIVE LAND: HISTORICAL RooTs OF THE MEXICAN-
AMERICANS 59-60 (David J. Weber ed., 1973).
30. JOAN N. MOORE, MEXICAN-AMERICANS 1 (1970).
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who attempt to fully assimilate by relinquishing their cultural traditions. 3 1
Similarly, Richard Delgado and Derrick Bell have used storytelling to show
how minorities are injured by racism that affects the hiring process of law
school faculties. 32 Likewise, Mari Matsuda has used narrative to show how
minorities are harmed by hate speech.
33
The philosopher Jacques Derrida's notion of justice is also instructive in
explaining the importance of narrative as the voice of the outsiders. For
Derrida, justice is a "relation or debt from one person to another." 34 Justice
is an "incalculable demand to treat the other on the other's terms." 35 Derrida
insists that "[t]o address oneself in the language of the other is, it seems, the
condition of all possible justice."'36 Because narrative provides minorities
with a way to communicate how they have been harmed, narrative is the
language of the other. Since justice requires that we treat the other on the
other's terms, outsiders should be permitted to use narrative. For Derrida,
justice does not permit a dominant group to force its linguistic practices on a
minority group. 37 Thus, it is wrong for a majority to impose its legal
language, i.e., the traditional forms of legal argument, on outsider groups.
Narratives and conventional modes of legal argument seem to constitute
incommensurable languages. There appears to be no reason to believe that
narratives are necessarily translatable into traditional modalities of legal
argument. Indeed, the fact that minorities experience the differend
demonstrates this point. Lyotard contends that the differend arises precisely
from the untranslatability or "the incommensurability of phrases and phrase
systems." 38 He asserts: "There are a number of phrase regimens: reasoning,
31. See generally Johnson, supra note 2.
32. See Delgado, supra note 1, at 2430-34. DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 140-61 (1987).
33. See generally Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
34. LITOW[TZ, supra note 8, at 92.
35. Id.; cf Drucilla Cornell, From the Lighthouse: The Promise of Redemption and the
Possibility of Legal Interpretation, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY AND
PRACTICE 161 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992) ("The aspiration to a just and egalitarian state
proceeds from the irreducible responsibility of the subject to the others. Each other has her
claim, and her claim must be heeded.").
36. LITOWITZ, supra note 8, at 92.
37. See id. at 206 n.35.
38. Id. at 119. "When one genre or phrase system is wrapped over another, the
incommensurability produces a differend, a remainder, an injustice, or a wrong that cannot be
communicated or translated into the universe of the phrase regime or genre which is
responsible for causing the differend." Id. at 121.
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knowing, describing, recounting, questioning, showing, ordering, etc.
Phrases from heterogeneous regimens cannot be translated into the other."
'39
This has important implications. First, it supports the idea that
minorities have a different conceptual scheme than the dominant group. One
philosopher, Donald Davidson, has argued that one conceptual scheme is
different from another if it is not translatable. 40 Since outsider narrative is
not necessarily translatable into the mainstream forms of legal argument, it
represents an alternative conceptual framework. Outsiders, then, operate
from a different conceptual scheme. This different conceptual scheme
expressed through narratives explains why it is plausible to suppose that
there is a distinctive "voice of color."
This conclusion is highly significant. Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry,
for example, have questioned the existence of the voice of color.4 1 They ask,
for example, why a white person could not write in the voice of color.42 The
fact that minorities have a different conceptual scheme from whites makes it
plausible to suppose that there is a distinctive voice of color which is based
on that distinctive conceptual scheme. It also explains why whites cannot
write in the voice of color. They cannot speak in the voice of the outsider
because they have a different conceptual framework.
The differences in conceptual schemes or world views can be clearly
seen in the different ways that whites and outsiders view the world. For
example, Richard Delgado has described the white majority's view on race
in America as follows:
Early in our history there was slavery, which was a terrible thing. Blacks
were brought to this country from Africa in chains and made to work in the
fields. Some were viciously mistreated, which was, of course, an
unforgivable wrong; others were treated kindly. Slavery ended with the Civil
War, although many blacks remained poor, uneducated and outside the
cultural mainstream. As the country's racial sensitivity to black's plight
increased, the vestiges of slavery were gradually eliminated by federal
statutes and case law. Today, blacks have many civil rights and are protected
from discrimination in such areas as housing, public education, employment,
39. LYOTARD, supra note 13, at 128.
40. DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH & INTERPRETATION 184-85 (1984)
("[S]peakers of different languages may share a conceptual scheme provided there is a way of
translating one language into the other.").
41. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on




and voting. The gap between blacks and whites is steadily closing, although
it may take some time for it to close completely .... Most Americans are
fair-minded individuals who harbor little racial prejudice. The few who do
can be punished when they act on those beliefs.
43
Thus, whites see the world as a place where racism has been overcome. 44 In
stark contrast to that world view is the outsider perspective. It holds that the
history of
black subordination in America [is] a history "gory, brutal, filled with more
murder, mutilation, rape and brutality than most of us can imagine or easily
comprehend." This . . . history continues into the present, implicating
individuals still alive. It includes infant death rates among blacks nearly
double those of whites, unemployment rates among black males nearly triple
those of whites, and a gap between the races in income, wealth, and life
expectancy that is the same as it was fifteen years ago, if not greater. It
includes despair, crime, and drug addiction in black neighborhoods, and
college and university enrollment figures for blacks that are dropping for the
first time in decades. It dares to call our most prized legal doctrines and
protections shams-devices enacted with great fanfare, only to be ignored,
obstructed, or cut back as soon as the celebrations die down.
4 5
Minorities, then, view the world as still very much infected with racism. For
instance, minority scholars describe a world where racial minorities
experience numerous "microaggressions. ' 4 6 "Microaggressions" are "subtle,
stunning, often automatic, and non-verbal exchanges which are 'put downs'
[of minorities].'47 Members of the dominant group, however, seem to view
racism as largely a thing of the past. Consistent with a conceptual
framework that does not see race as presenting a significant problem, critical
43. Delgado, supra note 1, at 2417.
44. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstructing Homo[genous] Americanus: The White
Ethnic Immigrant Narrative and Its Exclusionary Effect, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1493, 1523, 1525
(1998) ("The White ethnic immigrant narrative has helped construct and reinforce a version
of racism under which ... Whites claim racial innocence .... [This narrative] reinforces the
myth that racism ... is not a serious injury or harm that can persist through history; and that
racism and racist attitudes are not entrenched in current economic structures and social
norms.").
45. Delgado, supra note 1, at 2417-18.
46. See Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L. J. 1559, 1565 (1988).
47. Id. at 1565.
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scholars have pointed out that whites see themselves as raceless.48 Thus,
whiteness is said to be "transparent." 49 "[T]o be white is not to think about
it."' 50 In my view, outsiders have written a number of narratives, in part, to
show the omnipresence of racism. For example, Patricia Williams describes
the racism that she experienced in the ordinary act of shopping where a store
employee told her that the shop was closed even though it was early
afternoon and there were whites shopping in the store.5 1 Similarly, Charles
Lawrence has described how whites have sought to "praise" him by stating
"I don't think of you as a Negro." 52 Likewise, Margaret Chon has observed
that Asian-Americans experience as racist the often received compliment
that they "speak such good English."
'53
These differences in conceptual schemes help explain related
phenomena. Minorities have observed that whites tend to criticize outsiders
for raising issues of race. 1 This criticism is understandable once one
perceives the different conceptual schemes at work. According to the
conceptual scheme of the dominant group, racism is no longer a significant
problem in America. Given this, it makes sense that whites are troubled by
the outsider's insistence that racism continues to be a problem.
This difference in conceptual schemes may also help explain the appeal
that "color-blind constitutionalism" has for many members of the dominant
group. According to this view of the constitution, it is improper to take race
into account in making a decision, even if the failure to consider race would
operate to the disadvantage of minorities. 55 Minority legal scholars have
48. See, e.g., IAN F. HANEY-LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RACE 158 (1996) (stating that "the tendency not to see oneself in racial terms is widespread
among whites").
49. Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See ": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 969 (1993).
50. Id. at 969.
51. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 44-45 (1991).
52. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 318 (1987).
53. Chon, supra note 3, at 6.
54. See, e.g., id.; Robert S. Chang & Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Nothing and
Everything: Race, Romer and (Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual) Rights, 6 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS
J. 229, 244-245 (1997) ("It is clear that, for many, to document racism is to improperly raise
the issue of race.").
55. See generally Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind, " 44
STAN. L. REv. 1 (1991). The classic statement of color-blind constitutionalism is found in
Justice Harlan's famous dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
(upholding segregation on passenger trains). There, Justice Harlan stated:
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criticized color-blind constitutionalism on the ground that it perpetuates the
subordination of minority groups. 56 Although there may be no "legitimate
rationale" 57 for the failure to recognize race, the difference in conceptual
schemes between minorities and the dominant group makes it possible to
understand why a color-blind constitutionalism is plausible to whites. If
racism is confined to the distant past and is no longer a significant problem,
it makes little sense to take race into account in decision-making.
Beyond all of this, the use of narrative is philosophically important for
outsiders because it provides a way for minorities to achieve authenticity.
John Calmore has observed that minority intellectuals must "battle to avoid
being rendered inauthentic by the pressures of adapting to the white
world."' 58 Martin Heidegger is one of the leading philosophers of this
century who has done important work on the notion of authenticity that is
not yet well-known in the legal academy. His discussion of inauthentic
human beings helps explain the philosophical significance of narrative for
outsiders. It provides a way for minorities to escape from standard practices
of the mainstream world and thereby become authentic.
In his major philosophical work, Heidegger sought to ascertain "the
meaning of being." 59 People can comprehend the notion of being in two
distinct ways, "authentically and inauthentically." 60 The authentic route
[l]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no
superior dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil
rights all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most
powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or
of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are
involved.
Id. at 559.
56. See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 55, at 2-3; see also HANEY-L6PEZ, supra note 48, at
178 ("Race-blindness is perverse: although it purports to combat racial stereotypes, it actually
leaves racist beliefs intact and attacks instead the efforts to challenge and remake those
beliefs.").
57. Gotanda, supra note 55, at 637.
58. John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an
Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2129, 2170 (1992).
59. Harrison Hall, Intentionality and World: Division I of Being and Time, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION To HEIDEGGER 135 (Charles Guignon ed., 1993); see also Charles
Guignon, Introduction to THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HEIDEGGER 2 (Charles Guignon
ed., 1993) ("Heidegger's lofty ambition was to rejuvenate philosophy [and at the same time,
Western culture] by clearing away the conceptual rubbish that has collected over our history
in order to recover a clearer, richer understanding of what things are all about.").
60. Hall, supra note 59, at 135.
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provides us with the most accurate understanding of what it is to be.6 1
Heidegger provides an important analysis of inauthentic human beings. In
engaging in specific activities and tasks, we express our societal
understanding of what it is to be.62 In Heidegger's view, we generally do so
in an inauthentic way. 63 Part and parcel of this societal understanding of
what it is to be is an idea of the appropriateness of our goals and tasks and of
the ways in which we carry them out.64 In general, this sense is expressed in
social norms of behavior.65 These norms reveal themselves in such
statements as "One just doesn't do that," "One doesn't do that here, in that
manner," or "One always.. ." and so on.66 For Heidegger, these norms are
omnipresent as the possible expressions of the societal notion of what it is
proper or fitting to do.
67
According to Heidegger, we are always and everywhere selecting from
among the culturally determined alternatives for acting.68 In so doing, we
often choose to do "what one does." 69 "[W]hen we choose to interpret our
being in the public way-living in the world of the one,.., doing what one
does, we 'fall' into the inauthentic way of being."
70
When we fall into an inauthentic way of being, we act as one acts. We
engage in activities and interpret the world in the manner that is normal in
our society.7 1 This limits the possibilities for action to what lies within the
61. Id.; see also Charles B. Guignon, Authenticity, Moral Values, and Psychotherapy,
in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HEIDEGGER 228 (Charles Guignon ed., 1993) ("(For
Heidegger, authenticity] points to a way of life that is higher than that of average
everydayness.").
62. See Hall, supra note 59, at 136.
63. Id.; see also Guignon, supra note 61, at 227 ("Inauthenticity is characterized by
'falling' and 'forgetting."').





69. Id. Heidegger observes: "Primarily and usually the self is lost in the one. It
understands itself in terms of the possibilities of existence which 'circulate' in the 'average'
public way of interpreting Dasein today." MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 35 (1977).
70. See Hall, supra note 59, at 137. Heidegger writes: "The one as that which forms
everyday being-with-one-another... constitutes what we call the public in the strict sense of
the word. It implies that the world is already primarily given as the common world." MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF TIME: PROLEGOMENA 246 (1985).
71. See HUBERT L. DREYFUS, BEING-IN THE-WORLD: A COMMENTARY ON HEIDEGGER'S
BEING AND TIME, DIVISION 1 328 (1991). Heidegger explains: "The 'one' has its own ways in
which to be. That tendency of being-with which we have called 'distantiality' is grounded in
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realm of a standard world- i.e., the typical, the usual or that which is
appropriate. 72 The inauthentic person does precisely what anyone would do
in that kind of circumstance. 73 Inauthenticity means that we fall into the
"anonymity and dispersion of the one."74
With Heidegger's analysis in hand, it is possible to see clearly why
narrative is important for outsiders. When outsiders produce narrative as
scholarship they are not following the traditional norms of scholarship.
75
They are doing something that does not conform to mainstream practices.
Thus, narrative provides a way for minorities to be authentic in their
intellectual life because "it provides a way to move away from standard
practices in scholarship. Producing narrative as scholarship provides a way
for minorities to become authentic in Heidegger's sense and escape the
banality of the one and the "nullity of inauthentic everydayness." 76
III. INTERNAL VERSUS EXTERNAL APPROACHES IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
Some legal philosophers would contend that such theorists, in using
narrative, take an externalist approach to law and judicial decision-making.
The distinction between internal and external approaches in jurisprudence
has become a central focus of legal philosophy. 77 Externalist approaches to
legal decision-making seek to appraise legal practice on the basis of criteria
or theory external to that practice.78 In contrast to this approach are
the fact that being with-one-another concerns itself as such with averageness, which is an
existential characteristic of the 'one."' HEIDEGGER, supra note 69, at 164-65.
72. See DREYFUS, supra note 71, at 234; see also Guignon, supra note 61, at 226
("[I]nvolvement in public forms of life can have a pernicious effect. It threatens to level all
decisions to the lowest common denominator of what is acceptable and well adjusted.").
73. See DREYFUS, supra note 71, at 235; see also Guignon, supra note 61, at 226
("Inauthentic Dasein is dispersed into a multiplicity of humdrum routines, drifting with the
latest fads.").
74. See DREYFUS, supra note 71, at 313.
75. See, e.g., FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 6, at 38-39 (describing how storytelling or
narrative is a non-traditional form of scholarship); Mary 1. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship:
The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 683, 684 (1992) ("Outsider scholarship is
created and defined, in part, by contrast to traditional legal scholarship.").
76. See DREYFUS, supra note 71, at 315.
77. See generally DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW & TRUTH (1996); Pierre Schlag, Clerks in
the Maze, 91 MICH L. REv. 2053, 2059 (1993) ("[The internal/external distinction] is
typically used to patrol the borders of Law's Empire. It is used to rule out of bounds any
perspective on law that is not consonant with what the judicial persona already takes to be
'law.'").
78. Douglas Lind, Constitutional Adjudication as a Craft-Bound Excellence, 6 YALE
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internalist theorists. They take the position that judicial decision-making is
autonomous from external standards or disciplines. 79 According to this
internal point of view, there is no way to evaluate legal decision-making
except by considering the internal conditions for excellence in legal
practice. 80 One who takes the internalist position examines the practice of a
craft to ascertain and describe the "interpretive methods and linguistic
conventions" employed by those who engage in such craft.8 1 Given this, the
internalist approach to adjudication seeks to ascertain and describe the
conventions actually employed by the practitioners of adjudication-i.e.,
lawyers and judges.
For example, one internalist, Philip Bobbitt, has described the six ways
that lawyers argue for propositions in constitutional law. 82 He calls these
forms of argument "modalities": (1) the "historical"--"relying on intentions
of framers"; (2) the "textual"-"looking to the meaning of the words of the
Constitution alone"; (3) the "structural,"-"inferring rules from the
relationships that the Constitution mandates"; (4) the "doctrinal,"--
"applying rules generated by precedent"; (5) the "ethical"-"deriving rules
from those moral commitments of the American ethos that are reflected in
the Constitution"; and (6) the "prudential"-"seeking to balance the costs
and benefits of a particular rule."'83
A judicial decision is then evaluated in terms of these internal
modalities. A judicial decision is justified if one of these six internal
modalities is used to render the decision. Thus, a legal decision is legitimate
to the extent that it follows the forms of argument, i.e., one of the six
modalities, recognized within our legal practice by attorneys and judges.84
J.L. & HUMAN 353, 356-57 (1994); see also Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the
Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 955 (1988) (discussing how most scholars
take an externalist approach to law.).
79. See Lind, supra note 78, at 357. Stanley Fish describes the internalist perspective as
follows: "the law does not wish to be absorbed by, or declared subordinate to, some other-
nonlegal-structure of concern; the law wishes, in a word, to be distinct, not something else."
Stanley Fish, The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, in ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE
ANTHOLOGY 133 (Anthony D'mato ed., 1996).
80. See Lind, supra note 78, at 357; see also Stephen R. Perry, Professor Weinrib "s
Formalism: The Not-So-Empty Sepulchre, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 597, 598 (1993)
(describing internalist approaches as holding that "law can be understood and justified only in
terms of itself, and not by reference to some external goal or ideal").
81. See Lind, supra note 78, at 359.
82. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).
83. Id. at 12-13.
84. See PATTERSON, supra note 77, at 137.
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Thus, the forms of argument, or the internal modalities, are the ways in
which legal propositions are shown to be true or false.85 Contrary to
externalist approaches, legal statements are not true by virtue of something
separate and apart from the modalities and external to law as it is normally
conceived.
86
In contrast, external legal theorists seek to discover principles for legal
decision-making that are external to the craft of adjudication. 87 Thus, they
have sought to use techniques and theory from such external disciplines as
philosophy or literature to evaluate the results of judicial decision-making.
88
A. An Internalist Critique of Narrative or Storytelling
It seems that internalists would view narrative or storytelling as an
externalist approach to law. Narrative, for example, does not seem to be one
of the internal modalities-i.e., one of the forms of legal argument-that
would be recognized by the practitioners of adjudication. Narrative, they
would argue, lies outside of the practice of adjudication. Any judicial
decision based on narrative would therefore be illegitimate on an internalist
view. Indeed, the internalist contends that externalist standards are
irrelevant. 89 Why? Because externalist theories permit the meaning of legal
propositions to be determined separate and apart from actual legal
practice. 90 According to internalists, however, actual legal practice gives us
the only legitimate way to ascertain legal meaning.91 Therefore, since
external theorists base legal meaning on criteria which are external to legal




86. See id.; Michael C. Dorf, Truth, Justice, and the American Constitution, 97 COLUM.
L. REv. 133, 147 (1997) ("Bobbitt does not identify the truth [or legitimacy] of statements of
constitutional law with conditions external to the practice of constitutional law."). According
to the internalist approach, "were it necessary for the law to have recourse to a supplementary
discourse at crucial points, that discourse would be in the business of specifying what the law
is and consequently, [the law's] autonomy would have been compromised indirectly." Fish,
supra note 79, at 133.
87. See Lind, supra note 78, at 370.
88. Id.
89. See PATTERSON, supra note 77, at 137; Lind, supra note 78, at 396.
90. See Lind, supra note 78, at 390.
91. Id.
92. Id.; see also PATTERSON, supra note 77, at 137 ("Theory is banished not because it
is wrong, but because it is irrelevant.").
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Given this distinction between internal and external approaches, one can
better understand a well-known criticism of the landmark case Brown v.
Board of Education.93 In Brown, the Supreme Court held that it was
impermissible to segregate children in public schools on the basis of race.94
Brown is often criticized because the Supreme Court relied on psychological
studies to reach its decision-i.e., it relied on something external to law.9
5
Therefore, the decision is sometimes said to be illegitimate. Theory is
external to law, and, therefore, decisions based on external theory are
illegitimate.
In this regard, one critic of critical race theory has raised an argument
against narrative or storytelling that seems to be based on an internalist view
of law. He criticizes storytelling, or the use of narrative, on the grounds that
lawyers are supposed to deal with legal doctrine, not stories.96 He asserts
that "lawyers must look beyond stories to questions of doctrine." 97 Thus,
storytelling or narrative poses a danger because "it can convince people to
adopt a position without giving them a doctrinal basis for it."'98 The concern
seems to be that storytelling is not a recognized mode of legal argument
whereas doctrine is a recognized mode. Therefore, legal decision-making
that is based on storytelling is illegitimate.
93. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). As Derrick Bell has explained, "The Supreme Court's 1954
decision in Brown v. Board of Education has taken on a life of its own, with meaning and
significance beyond its facts," DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 544 (3d ed.
1992), and "triggered a revolution in civil rights law." Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1980).
94. 347 U.S. at 494-95.
95. See, e.g., GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 501 (2d ed. 1991)
("Brown's reliance on empirical social science data has been the subject of continuing
controversy."). Id.
96. See Douglas E. Litowitz, Some Critical Thoughts on Critical Race Theory, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 503, 521 (1997).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 522. Judge Pierre Leval seems to have had a similar concern in mind when he
recently stated that narrative techniques pose a threat to judicial decision-making. He writes
The objectives and duties of the judicial opinion are far different from those of
polemics, poetry and the narrative forms of literature; the employment of their
rhetorical techniques of suggestion and evocation will more likely be at the expense
of, than in the service of the opinion's capacity to achieve its goals. Pursuit of literary
techniques is more likely to undermine than to reinforce the success of the opinion in
meeting its judicial obligations.
Pierre N. Leval, Judicial Opinions As Literature, in LAW'S STORIES 207 (Peter Brooks & Paul
Gewirtz eds., (1996).
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The internalist approach may appear to be a common sense approach.
We typically teach first year students to use the forms of legal argument.
Thus, we tend to teach them to take an internalist approach to law. It is
possible to notice the change in students as they shift to an internalist
perspective. At the outset, they may be concerned about the justice or
morality of a legal decision, i.e., external matters. However, they are
indoctrinated in the first year to "think like a lawyer." They learn to narrow
their focus and to consider only internal matters. They learn to stay within
the accepted forms of legal argument.
B. A Response to the Internalist Critique of Narrative
The consequences of an internalist approach may be negative for
minorities. This result should not be too surprising. Outsiders-women and
minorities--did not formulate our legal practices or modes of argument.
Their perspective is not reflected in the practices. Thus, it would be
surprising if their interests were protected by the internal forms of argument.
I believe that this internalist approach is mistaken and that it is possible to
defend, on philosophical grounds, an externalist approach that incorporates
narrative.
1. Narrative and External Approaches to Law
As for the critics complaint that narrative that introduces something
external to conventional legal doctrine into legal decision-making, the
following may be said. The critics' position is not persuasive because the
idea that legal decision-making is a function of something other than
internal doctrine is well-established. The legal realists, for example, spent
much time analyzing the nature of adjudication. They concluded that
"traditional legal rules and concepts have limited value." 99 Indeed, leading
realists took the position that "doctrine plays no role whatever in court's
decision-making."' 00 Instead, considerations external to law determined the
99. WILLIAM W. FISHER, III ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 164 (1993); see also
ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR. & NANCY LEVIT, JURISPRUDENCE: CONTEMPORARY READINGS,
PROBLEMS, AND NARRATIVES 13 (1994) ("[R]ealists believed that legal rules were of limited
use in deciding most controversies.").
100. FISHER ET AL., supra note 99, at 164; see also RAYMOND A. BELLIOTIrI,
JUSTIFYING LAW: THE DEBATE OVER FOUNDATIONS, GOALS AND METHODS 7 (1992) (stating
that according to the legal realists, judges "cannot use past legal doctrine ... [to] discover the
antecedent right answer to the instant case").
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results of adjudication. 10 1 The realists produced powerful arguments in
favor of the position that internal doctrine could not constrain judicial
decision-making. Most significantly, they argued that since legal doctrine is
"internally inconsistent," doctrine could not generate clear answers to legal
questions. 102
.The realists offered a number of suggestions regarding what external
forces might be at work in legal decision-making. For example, one famous
realist judge stated that judges decided cases on the basis of intuition or
flashes of insight. Joseph Hutcheson wrote:
I, after canvassing all the available material at my command, and duly
cogitating upon it, give my imagination play, and brooding over the cause,
wait for the feeling, the hunch-the intuitive flash of understanding which
makes the jump-spark connection between question and decision, and at
the point where the path is darkest for the judicial feet, sheds its light along
the way. 
10 3
In this regard, some advocates of narrative have suggested that stories
operate on mind sets through "flashes of recognition" or intuition. 104 In
relying on intuition, then, narrative operates well within established external
approaches to adjudication, such as legal realism.
Beyond this, there is no reason why legal philosophers or lawyers
should be satisfied with an internalist approach that restricts itself to the
modalities of ordinary legal argument. Other legal practices or conceptual
schemes may be better able to resolve the problems of our society. Thus,
arguably, legal philosophers/theorists should seek to reconstruct our legal
101. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 99, at 164.
102. Id. at 165; see also Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies and
Dworkin, in JOEL FEINBERG & HYMAN GROSS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 189 (4th ed. 1991) ("In
other words, while the realists claimed that all cases implicated a cluster of rules, they also
contended there were competing rules leading to opposing outcomes."). Subsequently,
scholars associated with the critical legal studies movement refined and developed the idea
that legal doctrine is inherently contradictory and indeterminate. See generally Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976)
(describing how law is infused with irreconciably opposed principles); Joseph William
Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984).
103. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278 (1929).
104. See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 1023




practices, our modes of legal argumentation, in order to create a conceptual
scheme that will better solve the types of legal problems presented in social
life. 105 As for the argument that externalist approaches are irrelevant, it
seems the following may be said. If externalist forms of legal justification
including narrative would be a more helpful instrument than our current
forms of legal argument, then we should attempt to construct such schemes
to help resolve practical problems. 106 We should not simply ban externalist
approaches in legal philosophy. In selecting a conceptual scheme for
resolving jurisprudential problems, for example, in deciding whether to
adopt an internal versus an external approach such as narrative, we should
be motivated by practical concerns.
How might narrative have practical value in terms of the resolution of
social problems? What practical considerations favor the use of narrative?
One major way that narrative may be useful is that it can advance reform-
especially racial reform. According to proponents of narrative, judicial
decision making is a function of mind set-"the bundle of presuppositions,
received wisdom, and shared understandings against a background of which
legal [decision-making] takes place."' 107 Mind set operates at an
unconscious level. 108 As a result, mind set may be transformed through
narrative. 10 9 Legal narrative, then, is a tool to change mind set. This is
especially true for counter narratives which provide alternative perspectives
through narrative-i.e., perspectives that run counter to the dominant
perspective. This can break down narrow habits of perceiving that stand in
the way of racial reform. Although some may question whether counter
narratives can transform the consciousness of dominant groups, there is
philosophical support for the proposition that generating alternative visions
of reality can advance racial reform.
The idea that generating alternative visions of reality through narrative,
especially counter-narratives or counter-stories, can advance racial reform
finds important support in the philosophy of science and contemporary
philosophy of law. In this regard, it is helpful to consider Thomas Kuhn's
105. Cf CHALLENGES TO EMPIRICISM 19 (Harold Morick ed., 1980) (stating one should
select a conceptual scheme on the basis of practical considerations).
106. Cf Rudolf Camap, P.F. Strawson on Linguistic Naturalism, in THE PHILOSOPHY
OF RUDOLF CARNAP 938-39 (Paul A. Schilpp ed., 1963) (stating linguistic or conceptual
frameworks may be changed or constructed to suit our practical needs).
107. Richard Delgado, supra note i, at 2413.




classic account of scientific change.' 10 Kuhn argued that during periods of
"normal science," perception is dependent on mainstream, shared
"paradigms." ' 11 According to Kuhn, a scientific revolution occurs when one
paradigm is replaced by another. 112 Paradigm shifts cause scientists to view
the world in new and different ways. 113 During scientific revolutions, then,
scientists experience perceptual shifts. 114 According to Kuhn, the transition
from one paradigm to another is a conversion experience that cannot be
compelled by logical argument. 115
Applying these notions to judicial decision-making, one leading
philosopher of law, Judge Richard Posner, recently has argued that major
reforms in law often are produced by a similar conversion process. 116 Such
conversion involves a perceptual shift where one comes to see the world
differently. 117 According to Judge Posner, this process explains the major
transformations that have happened in law, including the expansion and
recognition of civil rights. 118 Thus, the key turning points and watershed
110. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.
1970).
111. See KUHN, supra note 110, at 10-17, 113. Kuhn defines paradigms as "accepted
examples of actual scientific practice-examples which include law, theory, application, and
instrumentation together-[which] provide models from which spring particular coherent
traditions of scientific research." Id. at 10. Subsequently, Kuhn identified two primary
meanings of paradigms "exemplars, which are concrete problem solutions accepted by the
scientific community" and "disciplinary matrixes, which are the shared elements which
account for the relatively unproblematic character of professional communication and the
relative unanimity of professional judgment in a scientific community, and have as
components symbolic generalizations, shared commitments to beliefs in particular models,
shared values and shared exemplars." FREDERICK SUPPE, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
THEORIES 138 (1977).
112. See KUHN, supra note I 10, at 12; see also SUPPE, supra note 11, at 146-47
(stating that scientific revolution "requires rejecting the old disciplinary matrix in favor of
another which contains the new theory").
113. See KUHN, supra note 110, at I 11; see also SUPPE, supra note I 11, at 149 ("The
conceptual changes which come from accepting a new disciplinary matrix are like a gestalt
switch; two observers looking at the same things from within different disciplinary matrixes
see different things."). Id.
114. See KUHN, supra note 110, at 112-13 (describing experiments on reeducation
process of scientists).
115. Seeid. at150.
116. See RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 459 (1990).
117. See KUHN, supra note 110, at 149 (citing LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY,
14(e), I D 92 (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. Von Wright eds., 1969)).
118. See POSNER, supra note 116, at 151 (stating that conversion process explains
"many of the seismic shifts that have occurred in our law, such as the great expansion of
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moments in American law are the result of "changing outlooks."1 19
Attorneys and judges began to view legal doctrine in a new light. 120
Accordingly, there is reason to believe that providing alternative
perspectives through narrative may help stimulate a paradigm shift in the
area of race, causing lawyers and judges to look at legal issues implicating
race differently. 121
IV. NARRATIVE, SOCIAL CHANGE AND TRUTH
The notion that storytelling may help bring about social change
generates another objection. For example, Farber and Sherry argue that the
main goal of scholarship should be to ascertain the truth, not bring about
change. 122 This criticism seems to be based on a familiar dualism: the
alleged dualism between theory (scholarship) and practice (change). 123
There is a long tradition in philosophy which holds that there are various
dualisms. These dualisms include the alleged distinction between mind and
body124 and word and object. 125 There have been efforts to bridge those
dualisms. 126 In this regard, the alleged dualism between theory and practice
has been denied. For instance, one philosopher famously argued that the
point of theory/scholarship was precisely to bring about change: "The
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to
change it.'
127
liability on virtually all fronts since the 1950s, the expansion of the rights of criminal
defendants and of prisoners, the increased recognition of women's rights and the explosive
growth of constitutional law").
119. Id. at 152.
120. See id. at 151-52.
121. Cf Margaret Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699,
1722 (1990) (arguing that paradigm shifts in law are necessary in order to change the status
quo for oppressed people.)
122. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards ofDimitri Yurasov:
Further Reflections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REv. 647, 650 (1994).
123. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Black and White, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1647, 1682 (1997)
("The liberal canon divides theory and practice into rigid categories.").
124. See generally Rene Descartes, Meditations, in PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF
DESCARTES (E.S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross trans., 1967).
125. See generally LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, THE TRACTATUS LOGICO PJILOSOPHICUS
(D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness trans., 1974).
126. See generally RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).
127. Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in KARL MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS 158
(David McLellan ed., 1977).
[Vol. 30:683
PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Similarly, the American pragmatists also viewed the alleged distinction
between thought and action as an artificial construction. 128 Given this, the
Farber and Sherry view regarding the point of scholarship is one that has
been rejected by some thinkers. Thus, it is not a persuasive criticism of the
use of narrative in law.
Beyond this, the critics of narrative are also mistaken to disconnect truth
from practice or to seek change in the world. The notion of truth may be
closely tied to practice or social impact or social reform. According to the
pragmatists, for example, truth is a function of "social need." 129 Thus,
William James defined the truth as "whatever proves itself to be good in the
way of belief."130 Accordingly, the critics of narrative are wrong to assert a
sharp divide between seeking truth and seeking change or social reform.
Significantly, the possibility that narratives can stimulate racial reform
also has implications for Derrick Bell's notion that racism is permanent. 131
Bell contends that minorities will always be subordinated and that minorities
will be unable to truly establish their civil rights. 132 What might explain this
phenomenon?
One possible explanation is that minorities and members of the
dominant group operate from different conceptual schemes. 133 They see the
world and the issue of race through different conceptual frameworks. 134 In
my view, this may help explain the persistence of racism. So long as these
128. See Radin, supra note 121, at 1707; see also JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND
NATURE at xvii (2d ed. 1929) ("The chief obstacle to a more effective criticism of current
values lies in the traditional separation of nature and experience, which it is the purpose of
this volume to replace by the idea of continuity.").
129. POSNER, supra note 116, at 464.
130. WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM 76 (1947). William James offers additional
explanation:
Truth for us is simply a collective name for verification processes, just as health,
wealth, strength, etc., are names for other processes connected with life, and also
pursued because it pays to pursue them. Truth is made, just as health, wealth and
strength are made, in the course of experience.
Id. at 104.
131. See generally BELL, supra note 1.
132. Bell states:
Minorities "will never gain full equality in this country. Even those Herculean efforts
we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary 'peaks of progress,' short-
lived victories that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain
white dominance. This is a hard-to-accept fact that all history verifies."
Id. at 12.
133. See supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
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world views are not bridged, then racism may be, as Derrick Bell contends,
permanent. Narratives provide a way to bridge the parallel worlds. They can.
help generate new ways of seeing things-i.e., the paradigm shift. Thus,
narratives may provide the only way to undermine racism.
V. NARRATIVE AND REASON
Some have criticized the use of narrative on the ground that it is hostile
to the Enlightenment's ideal of "reason": that our institutions, including
legal institutions, should be based on reason. 135 They argue that narrative
seeks to change perspectives of the dominant group through stories instead
of reason. 136 Thus, the use of narrative is anti-reason. This argument is not
persuasive. The storyteller's reliance on something other than rational
argument to change points of view is consistent with scientific practice. As
discussed above, Kuhn has argued that scientific revolutions occur when
there is a paradigm shift. 137 During such a shift, scientists begin to look at
the world in different ways. Such a paradigm shift is a conversion
experience which Kuhn contends cannot be produced by rational argument
or reason. Thus, the position of the advocates of narrative is at least as
strong as actual scientific practice.
Beyond this, the present-day critics of narrative have distorted the role
of reason in law, overemphasizing its importance. Significantly, they are not
the first to do so. The realists criticized the legal formalists on the ground
that formalists gave too much importance to the role of logic or reason in
law and failed to acknowledge the importance of intuition in
adjudication. 138 Thus, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that the "felt
necessities... and... intuitions of public policy.., have had a good deal
more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should
be governed."' 139 Similarly, Roscoe Pound criticized formalism and its
elevation of reason as follows:
135. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 6, at 47-5 1.
136. See id. at 35; cf Larry Alexander, What We Do and Why We Do It, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1885, 1890-96 (1993) (stating that outsider scholarship "fails the test for rational
discourse").
137. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
138. See Douglas Lind, Logic, Intuition and the Positivist Legacy of H.L.A. Hart,
SMU L. REV. (forthcoming 1999).
139. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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It is an every day experience of those who study decisions that the results are
usually sound, whether the reasoning from which the results purport to flow
is sound or not. The trained intuition of the judge continually leads him to
right results for which he is puzzled to give unimpeachable legal reasons. 1
40
The critics of narrative are making the same mistake made by the formalists.
They seek to overemphasize the importance of reason in law. Realist legal
philosophy has shown that law is not about reason but is instead about
intuition or flashes of insight. In relying on intuition and flashes of insight,
then, narrative is firmly supported by the realist tradition in legal
philosophy.
Moreover, in the area of race, reliance on something other than reason to
generate reform may be especially appropriate. The issue of race may not be
resolvable by appealing to the Enlightenment's ideal of reason. 14 1 Long ago,
Thomas Jefferson pointed out that racial divisions were based not on reason
but on powerful feelings and biases. He wrote: "Deep rooted prejudices
entertained by the whites; ten thousand recollections, by the blacks, of the
injuries they have sustained.. . will divide us into parties, and produce
convulsions that will probably never end but in the extermination of one or
the other race." 1
42
Similarly, Charles Lawrence has observed that "[r]acism is irrational in
the sense that we are not fully aware of the meanings we attach to race or
why we have made race significant."' 43 Since racial divisions are founded
in something other than reason-i.e., deeply held prejudices and
sentiments-perhaps it can only be undone by techniques, such as narrative,
that do not depend on reason.
VI. CONCLUSION
The use of narrative in law poses a number of
philosophical/jurisprudential issues. Although the critics of narrative have
recognized the relevance of philosophy to the debate over the use of
140. Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REv. 940, 951
(1923).
141. See K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL
MORALITY OF RACE 179 (1996) ("Race has been a great challenge to the hope of reason and
the spirit of democracy from the beginning of the American republic.").
142. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (1781-1782), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 264 (1984).
143. Lawrence, supra note 52, at 330.
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narrative in law, they have not fully considered the philosophical issues at
stake. In this essay, I have sought to use philosophy to explain the
importance of narrative to outsiders and to respond to some key
philosophical objections to the use of narrative in law.
